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Abstract 
Scholars of institutional design attribute large importance to the choice of new institutions. 
The comparative analysis of how Rwanda and Zambia crafted their new electoral systems 
and the systems of government regards procedural, structural and rational choice vari-
ables which may influence the option for particular solutions. External influences and the 
type of transition are determinants that can decide which actors make their interests pre-
vail. The degree of innovation or conservatism of new institutions is mainly a result of the 
speed of the process and the kind of actors involved. However, rational reflections on how 
to produce legitimacy and minimize personal risks which take into consideration the state 
of conflict in the country decide on the speed and on innovative outcomes. The structured 
analysis of only two cases uncovers already that it is rather difficult to realise the transfer 
of design recommendations into reality. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Institutionengestaltung in Afrika. Wahl- und Regierungssysteme in Ruanda und Sam-
bia im Vergleich 
Die große Zahl an Veröffentlichungen zum Thema „institutional design” zeigt, welche Be-
deutung die Politikwissenschaft der Wahl neuer politischer Institutionen beimisst. Diese 
vergleichende Untersuchung der Institutionengestaltung in Ruanda und Sambia berück-
sichtigt historisch-prozessuale, strukturelle und interessenorientierte Variablen, die auf die 
Entscheidung für bestimmte Wahl- und Regierungssysteme Einfluss ausüben können. Es 
zeigt sich, dass externe Faktoren und der Verlaufstyp der Transition entscheidend darauf 
einwirken können, welche Akteure in der Lage sind, ihre Interessen durchzusetzen. Die 
Prozessgeschwindigkeit und die Struktur der beteiligten Akteure sind maßgebend dafür, 
wie innovativ oder konservativ die neuen Institutionen gestaltet werden. Das Interesse an 
Legitimität und persönlicher Risikominimierung bestimmen wiederum die Prozessge-
schwindigkeit und die Gestaltung innovativer Institutionen. Diese rationalen Entschei-
dungen berücksichtigen dabei die Konfliktsituation im Lande. Der strukturierte Vergleich 
zweier Fälle legt nahe, dass der Transfer von Empfehlungen des institutional design als 
schwierig gelten muss. 
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1. Introduction 
Democratisation seems to be all around since the Third Wave (Huntington 1991) reached the 
African continent. Taking multiparty elections as the major indicator for the opening of a re-
gime, the situation has changed impressively within the last one and a half decades. Nicolas 
van de Walle (2002, 2003) observed recently that, in the late 1980s, nine states south of the 
Sahara conducted multiparty elections, whereas only seven states failed to do so between 
1989 and the end of 2000. Three of the states that had avoided elections up till then have 
very recently held multiparty elections. All of them are situated in the Great Lakes Region: 
Rwanda saw presidential and parliamentary polls in 2003, Uganda just held its first multi-
party elections in February 2006, and the Democratic Republic of Congo very recently con-
ducted its first polls. 
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At the same time, the discussion on system change in Africa had to learn to differentiate be-
tween the cases. The total breakdown of one-party regimes (Bratton 1997: 91) did not lead to 
substantial democratisation; instead, this occurred in rather few cases (mainly Benin, Cape 
Verde, Namibia and South Africa according to Basedau 2003: 17). Processes in Africa did not 
develop in a linear manner towards democracy, transitions were either termed protracted, 
apparently endless, or as being stuck in a ‘floating’ state (Barkan 2000, Hartmann 2002: 312, 
Erdmann 2002: 324). Outcomes were and still are unclear. However, transitions always de-
mand for a new order of governance, hence, for institutional changes.  
This paper will discuss these institutional rearrangements of the systems of government as 
well as the electoral systems. The guiding question is: How and why did relevant actors in 
Rwanda and Zambia opt for particular systems of government and electoral systems? The 
study will show that historical and procedural conditions in the respective national cases 
broadly influenced the interest-led decisions of political actors crafting new institutions. It 
recognises that similar findings drawn from post-socialist states in Eastern Europe (Lijphart 
1992, Nohlen / Kasapovic 1996, Krohn 2003, Bos 2004) are transferable to Africa. 
The paper proceeds in four steps. At the beginning, it provides a short review of the theo-
retical debate on institutional design and distinguishes institutional crafting that describes 
the effective act of creation. The section also highlights the benefits of comparing the rather 
unorthodox couple of Rwanda and Zambia and develops systematic framework of ques-
tions for the research of both cases. On this basis, the paper then turns to a short description 
of the institutions crafted in Rwanda (section 3) and Zambia (section 4). By following the re-
search framework, this two-country-analysis renders possible the paper’s next step, the ac-
tual comparison of the two cases. Finally, the paper's conclusions emphasize that aside from 
the overall African preference for strong presidents, the impact of national factors – such as 
recent history, procedures and nationally shaped personal risk perceptions – is strong. 
Hence national context matters. 
 
 
2. A Three-Dimensional Framework of Analysis: Process, Structure, Interests 
The lively debate on constitutional choices, i.e. on institutional design, largely focuses on the 
system of government and the electoral system (e.g. Lijphart 1991, 1992, 2004, Betz 1997, Sar-
tori 1997, Reynolds 2002). The main question is whether one system type supports democ-
ratic development better than another. Arend Lijphart (2004) recently presented what are 
probably the most accentuated recommendations for an institutional design adequate for 
divided societies. He exposes a best-system proposal based on two core elements, power 
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sharing and group autonomy, thus ignoring Donald Horowitz’ warning of two years earlier: 
‘Designers who propound one-size-fits-all prescriptions will be especially disappointed’ 
(2002: 35).1 
Regarding systems of government, Juan J. Linz (1990a, 1990b) heavily criticised presidential 
systems for their autocratic bias and declared parliamentary systems to be preferable. His 
central finding is that new democracies should avoid to vest too much power in one sole in-
dividual (cf. Linz 1994: 6-25). Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey (1992: 28-36) 
agree with Linz’ criticism on pure presidential systems, but answer with differentiation. 
They conclude that there are different types of presidential systems with different effects. 
They prefer semi-presidential systems2 (Duverger 1980) to pure presidentialism. To summa-
rise their main argument, they suggest to counterbalance a powerful president with a prime 
minister who is controlled by the assembly (Shugart / Carey 1992: 50-51, similarly Lijphart 
2004: 102). 
Even though no one really defends pure presidentialism as the better system, several schol-
ars doubt the importance of the system of government to a country’s democratic perform-
ance. Dieter Nohlen speaks of a ‘double myth’ of the importance of system of government 
choice (1992: 94). It is neither the most central question which system to choose, nor is it to-
tally irrelevant. It is the context of the case in question that determines which system might 
be more appropriate. As a matter of fact, we find only very few cases in Africa that are not 
presidential. 
Critics of presidentialism have occasionally been accused of focussing on the wrong aspect: 
‘Winner-take-all is a function of electoral system, not of institutions in the abstract’ 
(Horowitz 1990: 76). Proponents of parliamentarism indicated the central importance of in-
terrelating the question to the debate on electoral systems (Lijphart 2004), while scholars of 
the African case pointed out how important the electoral system was in the case of ethnic 
heterogeneity (Bos / Schmidt 1997: 414). 
In general, representation, concentration and participation are the three main functions of 
electoral systems. They are joined by the two fundamental demands of simplicity and le-
gitimacy. However, it is impossible to craft an electoral system that fulfils all of the functions 
and demands in perfect equality. In particular, the functions of representation and concen-
                                                     
1  Horowitz (2002) identified four main dangers for institutional optimists: First, research relies too 
heavily on successful cases. Second, generalisations rely too heavily on the comparison of cases 
with similar colonial, cultural or regional features. Third, single cases might be overestimated. 
Fourth, international scholars tend to favour their home country’s system. 
2  Since Shugart and Carey identified five types instead of Duvergers three, they renamed the semi-
presidentialism premier-presidential systems. Duvergers term is used here because of its wider 
usage in science and political practice. 
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tration stand nearly irreconcilably opposed. Representation aims at including the whole 
range of relevant groups, including minorities. Concentration aims at an efficient aggrega-
tion of political positions in the assembly to keep governments stable and majorities clear-
cut.3 
By and large, two basic mindsets can be distinguished. They correspond widely with the 
central dichotomy of majoritarian systems and proportional representation (PR). One ap-
proach favours incentives for the cooperation of groups before elections. Barkan, Horowitz, 
Reilly and Sartori belong to this faction of scholars whose preoccupation is to produce an in-
stitutionally stabilised legislature who is capable of acting effectively. Concentration is pre-
ferred to representation. Thus they tend to favour majoritarian systems. The second ap-
proach focuses on inclusive representation of all relevant groups. The main goal of scholars 
such as Lijphart, Reynolds, Bos and Schmidt is to incite political groupings to cooperate after 
competitive elections. Loose majorities are accepted for the sake of broad coalitions in which 
every group has the potential to participate. Not surprisingly, this approach favours PR sys-
tems. 
The dichotomy only represents a basic decision for one of the main roads, while the various 
real types of electoral systems represent an extensive net of lanes leading in different direc-
tions. Therefore, the scholars named above do not all postulate the same design. Analysing 
agrarian societies in Africa, Joel Barkan (1995) argues for a first-past-the-post system that 
provides for a strong link between voter and representative. He adds: a face-to-face repre-
sentation possesses a higher quality than abstract group inclusiveness. Horowitz (1991, 1993, 
2002, 2003) and Benjamin Reilly (2001) propose alternative vote in a system of absolute ma-
jority to reward moderate behaviour of political opponents and to provide for an efficient 
concentration simultaneously. While Horowitz and Reilly want to avoid a second poll, Sar-
tori (1997) argues for the advantages of a double ballot system. He more or less prefers the 
French electoral system that fostered an efficient bipolarisation and ensured the representa-
tion of minorities. Andrew Reynolds subordinates concentration and simplicity to inclu-
siveness. He suggests a PR system with open lists in constituencies of a medium size (1995a) 
or a German-style personalised PR system (1995b). He and Lijphart worry about a frozen 
advantage for the incumbents where ‘it is naïve to expect minorities condemned to perma-
nent opposition to remain loyal, moderate and constructive’ (Lijphart 2004: 98). For the sake 
of consensus democracy Lijphart accentuates the function of representation. He therefore 
recommends a simplified version of the Danish PR system in bounded constituencies with 
                                                     
3  For a full discussion of functional claims see Nohlen/Kasapovic (1996: 183-187) and Nohlen (2004: 
155-161). 
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closed lists.4 Meanwhile, Bos and Schmidt (1997: 414-416) prefer a simple PR system to guar-
antee the inclusion of all relevant actors with the aim of attenuating politicised ethnicity. 
They reject excessive use of consociational elements due to their complexity, immobility and 
high costs. 
Returning to Horowitz’ insight that there might be no best system, the variety of opinions 
about the appropriate electoral system for divided societies seems to underline his state-
ment. There are too many context-dependent entrapments. For example, PR systems with 
closed lists may result in the neglect of a weak electoral periphery that a dominant party, 
which can often be found in divided societies, does not rely upon to win (cf. Weiland 1996: 
97-99). Furthermore, the geographic repartition of groups, the prevalence of strongholds or 
the size of the assembly can play a decisive role. Rein Taagepera concludes that it might 
seem that no advice can be given other than ‘Pick anything and try to muddle through’ 
(Taagepera 2002: 257). By no means should there be a confusing alteration of electoral sys-
tems. Voters should be granted the opportunity to learn from electoral outcomes and to 
adapt their behaviour with the implementation of their electoral intention in mind. A rather 
easy-to-understand system is a must in this respect. 
This short review of the debates on institutional design reveals the necessity of recommen-
dations based on the specific national context. This does not bar scholarly expertise from in-
fluencing the crafting of institutions, but it must obviously be quite individual. However, 
the academic debate intensified only after many African ‘democratisers’ had to opt for a par-
ticular arrangement in the early 1990s. Yet for the sequence of events, we cannot expect that 
scholars’ recent conclusions had an impact. Why, then, do actors opt for distinctive forms of 
the system of government and the electoral system? To clarify the dissociation from the aca-
demic discussion on ‘institutional design’, the process of actual implementation of a specific 
set of institutions shall be called the ‘crafting of institutions’. 
Rwanda is a particularly interesting case. The starting point of its transition, the year 1990, is 
the same as in most African Third Wave countries, but in the Rwandan case the process of 
crafting took a long and extremely troubled 13 years. It ended in 2003 with a new constitu-
tion and Rwanda’s first multiparty elections since independence. The country’s extraordi-
nary history, deeply affected by the 1994 genocide, suggests the need for a case study. How-
ever, case studies tend to cloud or cover general tendencies; and the Rwandan one-party 
state in fact broke down well before the genocide. A comparison with another sub-Saharan 
                                                     
4  Interestingly, for divided societies, he recommends a system that has been developed and prac-
tised in one of the world’s most homogenous societies. Even  more interestingly, the Danish sys-
tem tends to have majoritarian effects if the constituencies become too small, that is why the Dan-
ish added compensatory seats distributed proportionally at the national level. 
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case may sharpen the explanation of different outcomes without losing sight of general 
trends. Zambia is a good choice for the comparison because it shows a certain degree of 
structural similarity to Rwanda,5 but differs with respect to the historical process. The com-
parison is based on an analysis of primary sources (constitutions, laws, media coverage) and 
secondary literature as well as on qualitative interviews in both countries.6 It is undertaken 
by following a framework of analysis derived from the pertinent literature on political tran-
sitions (e.g. Huntington 1991, Bratton / van de Walle 1997, Lemarchand 1992, Mbaku / Ihon-
vbere 2003, Tetzlaff 2004, Hartmann 1999) and the genesis of political institutions (Nohlen / 
Kasapovic 1996, Nohlen / Krennerich / Thibaut 1999, Jones Luong 2000, Krohn 2003). It in-
cludes three main approaches, each presenting hypothetical factors of explanation, which 
are operationalised by a range of questions (see table 1). The first approach is based on the 
assumption that the historical process can influence the crafting of institutions. The second 
approach assumes that the positioning of the relevant actors is related to institutional deci-
sions. The third approach is based on the assumption that the actors’ interests can explain 
institutional choices. 
 
Table 1: Framework of analysis: approaches, variables and operationalisation 
First approach: the historically embedded process 
Type of initiation What are the historical reasons for the initiation of the transition? 
Type of transition Has the process been forced ‘from below’ or steered ‘from above’? 
Speed Did deadlines influence the thoroughness of the constitutional debate? Did the wish for 
rapidity dominate the process? Has the process been delayed, protracted or hurried? 
External influence Did donors determine or influence the process with concrete institutional guidelines? 
Second approach: actors’ structure 
Opposition unity Did a unified opposition exist or has the opposition been fragmented? 
Conflict management How did rival actors manage their conflicts? Has violence occurred? 
Political personnel How are political actor groups staffed? Are there ‘real democrats’ or rather ‘recycled  
elites’ (cf. Hillebrand 1993)? 
Third approach: actors’ interests 
Increase of legitimacy Did actors craft the institutions according to the people’s preferences? Were the chosen  
institutions supposed to immunise against external criticism? Did actors build a false  
front, an institutional façade? 
Neo-patrimonialism Did the ‘big men’ logic shape the actors’ institutional preferences? 
Risk minimisation Were the chosen institutions supposed to guarantee a certain degree of political influence 
on the part of the respective actors? 
Tradition Did actors resort deliberately to autochthonic, pre-colonial institutions? 
Source: Own representation. 
                                                     
5  Concerning cultural, geographic, religious, demographic, and economic variables. 
6  The semi-structured interviews took place in Lusaka and Kigali in November and December 2004. 
Interview partners included local political scientists, heads of constitutional commissions, senior 
state and party representatives, and government critics in both countries. 
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3. Rwanda: A Set of Innovative Institutions Lacking Transparency 
In Rwanda, today’s political institutions were not implemented directly after the demise of 
General Juvénal Habyarimana’s one-party regime. After the installation of a democratic sys-
tem was disrupted in the early 1990s, the 1994 genocide marks a hitherto unparalleled cae-
sura in Rwandan history, leading the country into a prolonged transitional period that 
ended with a new constitution and elections in 2003. 
The result is a presidential-parliamentary system of government, using Shugart and Carey’s 
(1992) pentamerous typology, with a directly elected president of the republic and a prime 
minister heading the government. Both of them interact with a bicameral parliament which 
is crafted of the chamber of deputies and the senate. The president appoints and discharges 
the prime minister who proposes the cabinet ministers. These have to reflect the composi-
tion of the chamber. A political party in possession of the majority of seats in the chamber 
must not occupy more than half of the cabinet seats. The chamber has the right to pass a 
vote of no confidence against the entire cabinet or any of its members with a two-thirds ma-
jority. The president may dissolve the chamber only once during the presidential term. The 
senate cannot be dissolved. Furthermore, the president has the right to veto any law with 
the consequence of returning it to parliament where it requires a two-thirds majority of the 
joined members of both houses to reject the veto. The president’s ability to rule with decrees 
is restricted, but he can present a law to the people. Bills accepted by referenda become ef-
fective without renewed involvement of parliament. Apart from the head of state, senators 
are powerful players in the Rwandan system of government. The senate has to approve con-
stitutional amendments, all organic laws and all bills concerning defence, security, criminal 
law, electoral law and basic freedoms. In addition, the non-partisan senate supervises the 
country’s political organisations’7 observance of the national objectives and the ban on divi-
sionism. This leads us to the electoral system. 
The parliamentary electoral system is very complex, divided into (at least) three elements, 
and could be called a segmented system with proportional focus. Segmentation, in this case, 
refers to direct and indirect modes of election. Twelve senators are indirectly elected for a 
non-renewable eight-year term by special electoral colleges in the provinces,8 four by the fo-
rum of political parties that is a compulsory collective body of all registered parties, and two 
by the academic community. Finally, the president appoints eight senators, and former 
presidents become lifetime senators. The representatives in the upper house are officially 
                                                     
7  The term ‘political parties’ is avoided in the constitution, but they are meant by the term ‘political 
organizations’. 
8  On the basis of the 2006 administrative reform, the part of the Rwandan constitution regulating 
the ballot for provincial senators is to be amended as there are only five provinces left. 
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non-partisan, they exclusively qualify as ‘inararibonye’, a local term which is difficult to de-
fine precisely – though it is a constitutional condition – but refers to a cloudy social concept 
of venerability. Their party affiliation is unknown; the electoral system is intransparent and 
provides the executive with a considerable additional influence on legislation. The situation 
is complicated by the fact that one-third of the deputies of the chamber are elected indirectly 
as well. 24 women, two representatives of the youth, and one for handicapped persons, all 
of them officially non-partisan, are elected by special electoral colleges on the provincial 
(women) or national (youth, handicapped) levels. Only 53 of 106 members of parliament are 
directly elected by a system of proportional representation with a five percent threshold and 
closed national lists. Seats are allocated by the Hare-Niemeyer method for a four-year term. 
The Rwandan president is elected with a simple majority of votes for a seven-year term. No 
candidate may serve more than two terms as head of state. 
 
 
4. Zambia: A Set of Conservative and Easy-to-understand Institutions 
Zambia’s new institutions were created in 1991 and came into force immediately after the 
fall of Kenneth Kaunda’s one-party rule. They were partly revised in 1996 and the constitu-
tional arrangement is still under debate. 
Zambia has a system of government that provides for a directly elected president, allowing 
us to use Shugart and Carey’s typology again. The executive power is exclusively exercised 
by the president or through officials dependent on him. The president is head of state, head 
of government and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. A vice-president, appointed by 
the president, has replaced the office of prime minister which existed during one-party rule. 
Besides serving as a substitute to the president in extraordinary situations, he mainly acts as 
a kind of minister for parliamentary relations; thus, by and large, the Zambian vice-
president reminds one of typical African prime ministers. All the cabinet ministers are solely 
dependent on the president, but they have to be members of parliament. The president can 
dissolve the only parliamentary chamber, called the National Assembly. However, he does 
so at the risk of losing his office because parliamentary and presidential elections in Zambia 
are always conducted simultaneously. This reflects the strict implementation of the constitu-
tional understanding of parliament, which ‘shall consist of the President and the National 
Assembly’ (article 62). The legislative powers of the president are limited. He may veto bills 
and restrict the amount of the national budget. A two-thirds majority can reject vetoes in the 
assembly. The president has no legal power to bypass the assembly, e.g. by using decrees. 
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The constitution does not provide for referenda that could open up a back door for the 
president to push through its will by means of populist action. 
There are two electoral systems that are related to the two directly elected national bodies: 
the president and the National Assembly. Members of parliament are elected by the so-
called first-past-the-post system, more precisely termed system of relative majority. The 
candidate obtaining the most votes relative to his/her competitors wins the seat without re-
gard to his/her absolute share. There is no need for a second ballot. The number of seats is 
identical to the number of constituencies plus a maximum number of eight members ap-
pointed by the president. Zambia comprises 150 constituencies, which allows up to 158 
deputies in the National Assembly. The president is elected in one single national constitu-
ency using the same first-past-the-post system. At least this has been true since the 1996 con-
stitutional review. The first multiparty presidential election held during the current period 
of democratisation utilised a system of absolute majority that requires a second ballot if 
none of the candidates reached more than half the valid votes. Zambia intends to return to 
this system after the 2006 polls because of several irregularities that occurred in 1996 and 
2000. We will return to this point later. Altogether, the system used in Zambia is probably 
the easiest to understand and therefore a rather transparent electoral system offered to ac-
tors in crafting institutions. 
 
 
5. Testing the Analytical Framework in Comparative Perspective 
Against the background of the constitution-making processes up until 2005, we now turn to 
the question why the actors opted for these institutional arrangements. Which of the factors 
clustered under the three research approaches best explain the outcomes? Are there general 
trends that can be derived from the study of our two cases? Due to a comparative perspec-
tive on the two cases, the answers on the questions become more visible as a single case 
study could exemplify. 
 
Explanatory strength of the historically embedded process approach 
First, we examine the variables clustered in the historically embedded process approach: the 
reasons of initiation, the type of transition, the speed of the process and the external influ-
ence. We start with the external influence, which observers from established democracies 
might tend to overestimate. In the two cases examined, no active external influences  deter-
mining outcomes of the process of crafting could be identified. Certainly, there were strong 
external impulses on the process as such, especially on its initiation in the early 1990s. But 
14 Stroh: Crafting Political Institutions in Africa 
Hartmann’s (1999: 296) finding that there has been no relevant influence on tangible institu-
tional outcomes can be affirmed by this study. External influence has not been the only rea-
son for the initiation of institutional reforms, but rather one of several interacting events. 
These events have been quite similar in the two countries compared. During the 1980s, eco-
nomic pressure on both countries increased due to internal mismanagement and declining 
cash crop prices (coffee for Rwanda, copper for Zambia). Since political legitimacy in both 
countries relied on the economic output (due to the lack of democratic input legitimacy), the 
failure of economic performance in conjunction with the moderate form of autocracy9 led to 
open discontent within the public. 
Zambia underwent a coup attempt in 1990 (Luchembe-Putsch), which was first reported as a 
success on the radio, provoking spontaneous public celebrations (Mwanakatwe 1994, Meyns 
1995). During student protests that year, at least 23 people were shot by police forces and 
roughly a thousand were arrested (ibid.) which stimulated further discontent. The rise of 
maize meal prices provoked additional mass protests. Meanwhile, the Zambia Congress of 
Trade Unions (ZCTU) became the driving force behind the protests. In addition to the im-
pressive articulation of dissatisfaction on the streets, criticism emerged within the ruling 
UNIP. Altogether very clear signals were sent to Kenneth Kaunda that something had to be 
done. Rwanda’s population did not go as far. Discontent was expressed more moderately, 
but nevertheless emphatically. Pioneers of the freedom of speech, such as journalists of 
Kinyamateka and Imabga or representatives of Dutembere (women association), began to criti-
cise the MRND regime. The rural population ‘on the hills’ practised civil disobedience to ex-
press their dissatisfaction.10 Internal criticism was coincidentally compounded with a mili-
tary threat from the Rwandan exile community in Uganda. The Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) were very effective in their attack on their home country in October 1990, coming to 
some 70 kilometres of Kigali before being repelled by French, Belgian and Zairian troops 
which effectively took over the fight from Rwanda’s weak armed forces. Here too, altogether 
very clear signals were sent to Juvénal Habyarimana that something had to be done. 
A rapprochement between the emerging opposition forces had been one of the first tasks to 
be tackled. This dynamic led to the creation of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD) in Zambia and to a joint action of 33 opposition intellectuals in Rwanda who both 
                                                     
9  Open expression of discontent might not have been possible in more autocratic regimes. Subsum-
ing Rwanda and Zambia under moderate autocracies draws upon the typology of Jean-François 
Médard (1991) is backed by the argumentation of Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997: 
77-82). Bratton and van de Walle first termed Rwanda a ‘military oligarchy” (1994: 473) before cor-
recting the classification in 1997 to the same type of ‘competitive one-party system” that Zambia 
also belonged to. 
10  People boycotted obligatory collective maintenance work (umuganda) or even destroyed umuganda 
efforts (Longman 1999: 342-344). 
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called for the reintroduction of multi-party politics. The international environment sup-
ported this development as the fall of the Berlin Wall produced an international climate of 
change towards democracy. In light of collapsing socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, 
Kaunda lost the legitimacy he had first drawn from his championing of ‘African socialism’ 
and then from his exploitation of the bloc confrontation in the Cold War. France explicitly 
put pressure on Rwanda with the La Baule discourse of François Mitterrand in June 1990, 
when the French president announced the linking of public development aid to the progress 
of democratisation (Bertrand 2000). In both countries we can discover a combination of in-
ternal, military and international challenges that shaped the initiation of political transition. 
The international conditions were similar in both cases. The military threat for the regime 
was different in scope, but similar in the danger for the regime’s survival. And, while the 
forms of expression of popular discontent differed, its underlying motivation was of a 
dominantly economic nature in both cases. The one-party regimes were mainly challenged 
because of their bad economic performance and not because of their autocratic governance. 
Since the initiation of the process was rather similar, it can be omitted as an explanatory 
variable for the different outcomes. 
Likewise, the pure type of transition is not a good indicator for the explanation of institu-
tional outcomes. The dichotomy of types ‘from below’ and ‘from above’ that is appropri-
ately used by many political scientists dealing with Africa (e.g. Lemarchand 1992, Mbaku / 
Ihonvbere 2003, Tetzlaff 2004), lacks the complexity needed to produce fruitful results.11 
Both cases stand for a transition ‘from above’ but crafted different institutions. The speed of 
the process is more decisive. Two important factors describe the speed of crafting: a) the to-
tal time span between the beginning of the process and the implementation of the results, 
and b) the allocated working period of the relevant constitutional commissions. Table 2 pre-
sents both factors. Creativity and innovation suffer from hurried processes. The less time the 
process leaves to the respective expert panel, the less innovative and creative the results are 
and the more the results rely on earlier decisions and well-known concepts. Even if nar-
rowly timed expert commissions presented some innovations, most fell victim to rapid 
compromises between politicians if the total time span for crafting has been correspondingly 
short. This has been the case in Zambia, where the Mvunga Commission did not have but 
half a year to propose a new set of institutions. Yet, this was not a lot of time, the crucial de-
cisions were reached during talks between UNIP and MMD protagonists within 14 days in 
                                                     
11  Huntington’s differentiation between transitions, transplacements, and replacements (1991) is not 
appropriate for Africa because it implicitly assumes that there are clearly identifiable groups of 
autocrats and democrats, preferably dividable into hardliners and softliners. This assumption does 
not generally hold in Africa. 
16 Stroh: Crafting Political Institutions in Africa 
mid-1991. The quick compromise averted innovations proposed by the Mvunga Commis-
sion (e.g. second chamber of parliament) and led to the perpetuation of old institutions, such 
as the first-past-the-post electoral system. The institutions crafted were mainly path-
dependent on the decisions made in the early 1960s when the first republic was created. The 
institutional compromise was meant to be provisional by the acting personnel, but was rein-
forced by the successful free and fair elections conducted under this arrangement. 
 
Table 2: Relation between speed and innovation 
 Total time span from start 
to implementation 
Allocated working period of 
constitutional commissions 
Crafting results 
Rwanda 13 years: 
September 1990-Mai 2003 
Karemera: 9 months 
Rutaremara: 3 years 
highly innovative 
Zambia 10 months: 
October 1990-August 1991
Mvunga: 6 months 
Mwanakatwe: not relevant 
conservative 
Source: Own representation. 
 
A similar development became apparent in Rwanda when the Karemera Commission sub-
mitted a constitutional draft broadly inspired by the French paradigm in 1991. The draft fa-
cilitated a first important step towards liberalisation. Parties other than MRND were al-
lowed and emerged in May 1991. The most important opposition parties formed a concerted 
committee (Comité de concertation). The committee included the Democratic Republican 
Movement (Mouvement démocratic républicain, MDR), the Social Democratic Party (Parti social 
démocrate, PSD) as well as the Liberal Party (Parti libéral, PL). It relied mainly on mobilising 
capabilities of the MDR which referred both in terms of its name and personnel to the for-
mer MDR-Parmehutu. The latter had been the single political party in Grégoire Kayibanda’s 
First Republic in the 1960s and 1970s, having its stronghold in central Rwanda while Ha-
byarimana’s regime originated from the north of the country. Faustin Twagiramungu, Kayi-
banda's son-in-law, became the MDR leader. Despite old antagonisms, progressive forces in 
the committee parties were ready to negotiate with MRND while the external opposition fo-
cussed on armed action. MRND and the committee formed a common interim government 
to continue the process of institutional crafting as part of ceasefire negotiations with the 
RPF, leading to the Arusha Treaty of August 1993. The treaty included a protocol on the in-
stitutional arrangement with a rather cumbersome name12 shortened here to ‘Protocol on 
Power-Sharing’ (PPS). The PPS provided for a weakened president, a powerful prime minis-
                                                     
12  Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Pa-
triotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government 
of October 30, 1992 and January 9, 1993. 
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ter leading the broad-based government, and a 70-member transitional national assembly. It 
did not contain electoral rules because of its transitional character. The PPS planned a new 
constitutional commission that would not be bound to any of the PPS’ provisions but 
charged with the task to create a fully democratic regime. The PPS did not come into force 
before the genocide to which approximately 10 percent of the Rwandan population (mainly 
Tutsi and moderate Hutu) fell victim and which led to the flight of approximately half of the 
population. Since the genocide is not at the centre of this article, we will concentrate on its 
institutionally relevant aftermaths. Almost isochronally to the first reports of assassinations, 
the RPF launched a renewed offensive on Rwandan territory,13 finally reaching its objective 
of ending the genocide and assuming power in Kigali in July 1994. Thereafter, the new RPF-
regime implemented the institutional provisions of the PPS. Modifications that were applied 
concerned the distribution of public positions between the political parties, which had be-
come necessary due to the ban of radical parties responsible for the genocide, including the 
MRND. The length of the period of transition was fixed to five years and was then pro-
longed another four years in July 1999. The RPF showed no signs of urgency with regard to 
the introduction of a new constitutional commission, but finally provided for the legal basis. 
Tito Rutaremara, a RPF senior official, became the president of a twelve-member commis-
sion, guiding a sound three-year process – enough time to consult various experts, study 
foreign models, discuss ideas in public meetings throughout the country and present an 
elaborated final draft to the transitional government and assembly, which made only minor 
changes. The constitution was presented to the population for referendum in May 2003. It 
obtained more than 90 per cent of the votes (Comelena 2003). 
The comparison of Zambia and Rwanda allows no statement concerning the democratic 
quality of the institutions crafted, nor are we able to draw any conclusions regarding specific 
arrangements. However, the speed variable explains whether institutions could have been 
innovative or were forced to stay rather conservative: innovation that bases on well-
considered aims needs time, while rapid decisions had to rely on well-known foreign or 
post-independence models. 
 
Explanatory Strength of the Actors’ Structure Approach 
Opposition unity, conflict management and political personnel are the potential factors clus-
tered in the actors’ structure approach. How useful is this approach for explaining institu-
tional outcomes? First of all, the unity of the opposition cannot explain specific outcomes as 
one would imagine. If strong presidents legally dominated an authoritarian regime, one 
                                                     
13  To be precise, the RPF had been positioned on Rwandan territory already. It officially controlled 
parts of northern Rwanda and had some troops in Kigali as concession of the Arusha Treaty. 
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could presume that a united democratic opposition would tend to diminish presidential 
power and lobby for a substantial mode of power-sharing. Rwanda’s first attempt in the 
early 1990s could serve as an example. Though the opposition was heavily divided along at 
least three cleavages (moderates vs. hardliners, domestic vs. exile, peace-loving vs. violence-
prone), they all agreed on decreasing presidential power. Whether oppositional unity was, 
however, the real explanatory factor in this regard is quite questionable. The situation as a 
whole rather implies a coincidence than a collaboration. The Karemera draft matched the in-
terests of the domestic committee opposition and the RPF as regards the weakening of the 
role of the head of state,14 while the MRND leadership mainly sought to prevent a total mili-
tary defeat. 
Later in the process, the RPF-dominated Rutaremara Commission stood as the counter-
example to the opposition’s unity. The howsoever structured opposition had no opportunity 
to actively push for a weak president and, indeed, a strong president – stronger than the 
transitional head of state – was created. Nevertheless, and not due to the opposition’s struc-
ture, the Commission members continued to emphasise the alleged power-sharing aspects 
of the constitution, including the PR electoral system. Meanwhile, Zambia’s MMD, present-
ing a very closed front during negotiations on the crafting of the institutions, blocked the in-
troduction of a purely US-style presidentialism with a clear-cut division of power between 
the executive and legislative branches. It also blocked the establishment of a second chamber 
serving to de-concentrate power; not to mention the idea of a broad-based power-sharing 
system. 
There might be a certain logic behind this. The actors of a divided opposition could try to se-
cure their share in power, which can obviously best be realised in a broad system of power-
sharing including a ‘government of national unity’. Yet, the question is whether the opposi-
tional structures are powerful enough, if divided, to achieve this objective against an incum-
bent authoritarian regime. In general, the line of argument advanced here shows that a focus 
on actors’ interests is necessary to explain institutional decisions while the actors’ structure 
is important to detect the relevant interests. 
Another point is the influence of conflict management. The process of negotiation in 
Rwanda was overshadowed by the simultaneous military option chosen by RPF forces. The 
main goal of the process of institutional crafting was to end a war. The Arusha treaties were, 
first and foremost, ceasefire treaties. The institutional arrangement was created merely for a 
transitional period. Its central element consisted of a very concrete distribution of state of-
fices, down to the nomination of specific office holders. The distribution of seats in the tran-
                                                     
14  The general perception had been that Habyarimana cannot be avoided as president at the end of a 
bloodless transformation process. 
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sitional assembly had been fixed in Arusha. A constitutional commission was part of the in-
terim institutions. After the genocide the RPF put great emphasis on the need for formally 
obeying the Arusha institutions. The parties that were the driving forces behind the geno-
cide were excluded and the division of power changed in favour of the RPF, but the institu-
tional arrangement remained intact. The export of the security problem with ex-FAR and in-
terahamwe groups to the neighbouring Congo together with the consolidation of RPF power 
within the Rwandan borders led to a relatively stable situation without an outright violent 
conflict. 
As far as conflict management in Zambia is concerned, there was always a return to the ne-
gotiating table before violent escalation transpired. Significant signals from the Zambian 
army that they could revoke support for Kenneth Kaunda, pushed him to negotiations 
without the actual use of force, if we simply interpret the Luchembe coup trial as one of the 
aforementioned signals. Politically, the military played but a minor role, as the absence of 
civil war led to a situation where political and armed actors were congruent. Instead, politi-
cians of the emerging (unarmed) opposition were able to organise meetings and publish in-
stitutional claims in newspapers. Armed government forces did not intervene nor intimidate 
them. Finally, the oppositional pressure led to roundtable negotiations. A coalition of Chris-
tian churches served as intermediary when they invited the relevant forces to the Anglican 
cathedral in Lusaka in July 1991. 
These less conflictive conditions might have lowered the tendency to worry about majori-
tarian arrangements. Conflictive conditions seem to stimulate the desire for broad power-
sharing arrangements, regardless of their different consequences. 
The political personnel, like the pace of the process, might be helpful in explaining the inno-
vative or conservative character of the institutions crafted. The original distinction of ‘real 
democrats’ and ‘recycled elites’ is not applicable to the cases because of the difficulties in de-
tecting ‘real democrats’. In both countries, the opposition was not primarily democratic but 
rather anti-regime. However, another distinction, viz. between ‘recycled elites’ and ‘replaced 
elites’ is helpful. In the time until the referendum of 2003 the Rwandan elite was replaced 
completely. Not only the political staff which had been involved in or which had been assas-
sinated in connection with the genocide were replaced. The survivors of the pre-genocide 
domestic opposition, like Twagiramungu and others, as well as at least 41 internal RPF crit-
ics (ICG 2002: 28f.) left the country and went into exile. The former RPF-head of state Pas-
teur Bizimungu resigned from office because he violated a law valid during the transitional 
period and prohibiting the foundation of new political parties, For the allegation of ‘divi-
sionism’ Bizimungu’s 15 years sentence has meanwhile been prolonged to 25 years impris-
onment. Today, very few politicians on higher posts, all of them undoubtedly supporters of 
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the current government, originate from the pre-genocide domestic opposition.15 Most of the 
leading figures returned from Anglophone exile countries (cf. Reyntjens 2004). This tidy re-
placement of political elites opened up the process for constitutional innovations, as nobody 
felt affiliated to earlier institutions, nor to the French model that highly influenced the Ka-
remera Commission. In contrast, Zambian political elites have rather been recycled. They 
were used to the old institutions and committed to the rule ‘never change a running system’. 
One can therefore hold that replaced elites tend to be more innovative while recycled elites 
are more conservative with respect to the crafting of institutions. 
 
Explanatory Strength of the Actors’ Interests Approach 
The third approach comprises four variables possessing conjectural explanatory capacity: 
the increase of legitimacy, the neo-patrimonial heritage, risk minimisation and pre-colonial 
traditions. We will start with the last one. Did actors deliberately resort to autochthonic, pre-
colonial institutions? Traditions were not of major concern to the actors that crafted or coun-
selled the creation of the institutions under examination. Political masterminds in both coun-
tries established a certain relationship between the preference for semi-presidentialism and 
the traditional role allocation between the king and the queen mother.16 But both systems of 
governments do not conform to Duverger’s concept, the Rwandan prime minister and the 
Zambian vice-president are de facto pure administrators and their existence can be ex-
plained more persuasively by other factors. 
Risk minimisation proves to be a more promising variable. The initial point is a simple as-
sumption: The more dangerous the consequences of institutional transition might be for in-
fluential actors, the more they will manipulate the institutional arrangement in favour of 
their personal safeguard. There is certainly no guarantee that the assumed institutional ef-
fects occur, but the degree of manipulation might be connected to the degree of risk. First, 
and as a consequence, we have to look at the quality of the transitional risk for the actors. 
Essentially, the risk can be two-dimensional. There is the  risk of losing economic resources 
or of falling victim to legitimate (detention) or illegitimate (assault) physical harm. Risk per-
ceptions, and probably also real risks, have been much more pronounced in Rwanda than in 
Zambia. As shown above, political conflict management in post-colonial Rwanda has been 
violent for a significant part of history. It has been interconnected with displacement, death 
                                                     
15  One example is the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Alfred Mukezamfura, interviewed in 
Kigali, Dec. 3, 2004. 
16  Interviews with Akashambatwa Mbikusitu-Lewanika (Lusaka, Nov. 8, 2004) and Tito Rutaremara 
(Kigali, Dec. 8, 2004). A similar role allocation of this kind existed at both courts, the Rwandan 
Mwami’s and the Zambian Lozi king’s. 
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and genocide. The belief of Rwanda’s current RPF-elite that they may lose office and power 
raises their considerations of an existential threat. Additionally, there is a strong link be-
tween political power and economic wealth in Rwanda.17 In Zambia, generally a peaceful 
nation, the risk has been lower. While the link between state and economy has been as in-
tense as in Rwanda, the danger of physical harm has been minor, though a certain risk can-
not be denied. But student uprisings and a failed coup attempt are not of the same quality as 
civil war and genocide. The Zambian game was not about all or nothing. The right strategy 
to minimise the risk for Kaunda seemed to be not to manipulate the institutional arrange-
ment openly but to present himself as the father of the nation, guiding her to multiparty 
democracy. He was convinced he would win free and fair presidential elections (cf. Bach 
1994: 35; Meyns 1995: 29; Mwanakatwe 1994: 224) which further reduced his wish for special 
institutional arrangements. Kaunda did not press for the creation of a second chamber 
(House of Representatives), which would have overrepresented rural politicians and tradi-
tional leaders, who were supposed to support him, but postponed this step after his pre-
sumed electoral victory. Frederick Chiluba has shown some ambitions to minimise the risk 
to lose, but on a rather more technical level. At a time when observers remarked the return 
to presidential office of several former autocrats (cf. Hartmann 1996), Chiluba wanted to ex-
clude Kaunda from Zambia’s 1996 presidential elections. A clause concerning a presidential 
candidate’s ancestry had been introduced in the electoral law. The new norm limits candi-
dateship to Zambians of Zambian-born parents, and Kaunda's parents were born in 
neighbouring Nyasaland, today’s Malawi. Since the overwhelming majority of his party de-
clined Chiluba asserted a change from an absolute majority to a simple majority rule in 
presidential elections, thus avoiding second-round ballots which might incite the opposition 
to unite. In contrast, the Rwandans were very keen on risk minimisation by intense, proac-
tive and rather sophisticated institutional innovation. 
The influence of neo-patrimonialism is rather ambivalent. It is difficult to decide whether ac-
tors consciously opt for a solution that fosters neo-patrimonial structures or whether it is 
rather an underlying cultural factor. However, there is little influence on the choice of the 
electoral system. Theoretically, single member constituencies produce a clear winner and 
sole representative of the electoral unit. Hence they fit in well with ‘big men’ structures. 
Empirically, Zambia opted for such a system, but Rwanda did not. Having said that, the 
preference for strong presidents is empirically visible in almost all sub-Saharan countries 
and, theoretically, plausibly linked to neo-patrimonialism (cf. Bratton / van de Walle 1997: 63-
65). Zambia and Rwanda opted for a strong president. Oppositional efforts to ‘parlamenta-
                                                     
17  In 2002, FPR members guided 17 out of the 21 biggest parastatal companies (ICG 2002), but since 
the MDR-ban movements in favour of other FPR members are probable. 
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rise’ the system of government in Zambia vanished, at the latest, with MMD winning the 
presidency. Similarly, efforts to reduce presidential powers in Arusha were eliminated in 
Rwanda’s 2003 constitution. Even during the transitional period, the Rwandan prime minis-
ter played a subordinate role in spite of his significant constitutional powers. Kagame’s 
claim to be vice-president instead of vice-premier underlines that perception dominated 
over legalism. None of the other applied factors offer more explanatory strength for the 
choice of very powerful presidents. 
Furthermore, legitimacy makes ruling easier. Legitimate institutions, i.e. institutions that 
reasonably satisfy the people’s preferences, are not supposed to be asserted by force. This is 
a big advantage in a changing world in which despotism is generally no longer tolerated by 
donors. In consequence, the legitimacy of institutions in developing countries consists of at 
least two dimensions: the internal and the external dimension. Decision makers have to sat-
isfy their own people and the donors. The remaining question is which level of legitimacy is 
necessary to stabilise the system? And, do actors fish for legitimacy or do they just look for 
the system presumably preferred by the people? 
First of all, it is important to regard the extent of legitimacy deprivation. Zambia suffered 
primarily from economic failure and closed governance that the people were tired of. 
Rwanda, on the other hand, had totally collapsed and restarted the political process after the 
genocide.  
The two main sources of legitimacy of the interim regime had been the implementation of 
most of the Arusha agreement and the interim character of government itself. At the same 
time, this meant that the transitional period could not have been prolonged endlessly with-
out the danger of losing its legitimacy. In light of Rwanda’s historical experiences, the intro-
duction of an electoral regime was not a sufficient means to achieve an adequate level of le-
gitimacy for new institutions. Internally, the wish for stability and safety is still dominant in 
Rwanda, while the Zambian population wanted to get rid of the one-party system that they 
associated with economic downfall. Externally, donors (and political scientists) were over-
whelmed with re-democratisation efforts and opening elections in Africa at the beginning of 
the 1990s, so that many tended to overestimate the persistence of this development, as we 
know today. In the case of Rwanda, donors are generally reluctant to criticise the political 
development as the international community failed to prevent the genocide. Consequently, 
Rwandan officials had to present institutions that satisfied both the donors’ wish for elec-
tions and their citizens’ wish for stability, but they very well knew that critique from both 
sides would not be too rigorous, whether because of hope, lack of alternatives, fear or a 
sense of guilt. This constellation enabled the Rwandan actors to craft electoral and govern-
ment institutions that allowed general elections, but restricted them for the sake of stability, 
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and that called for a government of national unity and broad representation in which the 
dominance of the ruling party was well assured. Zambians, on the other hand, wanted to go 
to the polls quickly. The old institutions were well known and not perceived as the reason of 
the ill, neither by the population nor by opposition intellectuals. All parties involved were 
convinced that the system could be rectified later, if necessary. 
In general, the historically determined level and quality of the need to increase legitimacy 
strongly influenced both processes of institutional crafting. Again, the incentives for the 
Rwandan regime to be rather innovative and act very discreetly were strong, while the pres-
sure for results in Zambia and the lower level of legitimate institutional renewal produced a 
much more conservative outcome. 
 
 
6. Some Concluding Explanations on the Interrelation of Processes and Interests 
Because Rwanda and Zambia differ in terms of institutional results as well as in terms of 
procedural and actor-centred factors, conclusions can be drawn as to why certain institu-
tions were chosen. A comparative analysis of the two cases shows that the crafting of institu-
tions in Africa is neither lacking in innovation nor in creativity nor is it simply following the 
blueprints of foreign systems. Historical heritage and proximity to the model of the former 
colonial master are not evidence for blind copying, but a result of deliberate decision. 
Institutional crafting is about a complex process in which history delivers the framework for 
actors who have to choose from different options. A set of eleven factors, extracted from the 
relevant literature, has been examined qualitatively in a small-N comparison (N=2). Their 
contribution to explaining why actors opted for distinctive forms of institutions has been di-
verse. Needless to say, all the conclusions drawn here are centred on the two cases under 
examination. Nevertheless, there are variables that seem to have a general significance and 
others that might be worth controlling by adding more cases. 
Sorting the explanatory strength of the variables, we can first of all affirm that traditional 
pre-colonial arrangements had no significant influence on new institutions. Unfortunately, 
this is the only variable that allows a clear answer of this kind. Several factors, especially 
those of the historic-procedural approach build the framework of action. There is neither a 
direct external influence, nor does the initiation or the type of transition directly determine 
the institutional outcome. But they may be decisive concerning who (and whose interests) 
will affect the arrangement. Since Rwandan opposition had difficulties to re-establish after 
the historic events in 1994, a comparison with its unified Zambian counterpart proves diffi-
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cult as to the role of a unified opposition. In Rwanda’s transitional period (1994-2003), veri-
table Opposition did not exist. However, this points to some of the more decisive factors. 
Two variables largely determined whether or not the outcome was conservative or innova-
tive. These are the speed of the process and the structure of the political personnel. While 
high-speed processes with recycled elites tend to produce conservative outcomes, time-
consuming processes with replaced elites open institutional crafting up to innovation. 
Where quick decisions are necessary, well-known institutional arrangements are preferred. 
These institutions resort to earlier national institutions or to foreign patterns, but they are 
never transferred blindly. Where new elites take time to create institutions, innovative ar-
rangements reflect even more clearly the actors’ interests. Meanwhile, conflict management, 
risk minimisation and the question of legitimacy influence concrete choices. The intensity 
and type of conflict that occurred before the crafting process affect these factors. 
In brief, Rwanda’s violent conflict (civil war and genocide) increased expectations for a new 
set of institutions. Innovation was possible and necessary to craft structures that were gen-
erally associated with democratic power-sharing and that guaranteed the stability of the re-
gime in power. Power-sharing arrangements are often more complex and less transparent 
than majoritarian arrangements. That helped to create a beneficial façade without sacrificing 
the regime’s stability. In fact, the dominant forces gained from this intelligent Rwandan so-
lution. Zambia, meanwhile, did not suffer from an intense violent conflict. A swift political 
solution to a political conflict in which nobody had to fear for his life, i.e. where the incen-
tives to minimise the risk to lose were minor compared to Rwanda, was preferred by elites, 
both in government and in opposition, who realised that the best source for legitimacy lay in 
multiparty elections conducted under an institutional compromise that could be rectified af-
terwards. However, even a speedily implemented institutional arrangement that produced 
and therefore gained legitimacy proved to be more persistent than anticipated. The most in-
novative politicians obviously tend to become conservative with regard to majoritarian ar-
rangements as soon as these institutions are supposed to support their own electoral suc-
cess. 
 
 
If this paper is a first attempt at a thorough, structured analysis of only two cases, it 
shows that much more research should be done on the creation – and reform – of institu-
tions in Africa, whose influence on the political development is most probably interde-
pendent with other factors. However, its influence is undeniable and in contrast to politi-
cal culture it is much more accessible for political steering. 
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